## 2AC

### 2AC Case – Ag

#### The alt’s method is *worse*; universalizing neolib misinforms transitions and disproves the K *in Cuba context*.

**Powell ‘8**

Kathy Powell. Lecturer. PhD Social Anthropology – National University of Ireland, Galway. Critique of Anthropology – Vol 28(2) p. 177–197 – Sage Database

Yet, within these broad patterns, it is clear from the behaviour of different¶ states and the diversity of political responses that neoliberalism has spread unevenly, been adopted selectively and hybridized with existing political¶ processes and political cultures; that neoliberalism in practice is characterized¶ by an ‘unstable and volatile historical geography’ (Harvey, 2005: 70).¶ Emphasizing the need to study such ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’, Peck¶ and Tickell insist that ‘[w]hile processes of neoliberalization are clearly at work in . . . diverse situations, we should not expect this to lead to a simple¶ convergence of outcomes, a neoliberalized end of history and geography’¶ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384, quoted in Gledhill, 2004). Such a focus not¶ only fractures the notion of neoliberalism as a monolithic force; its emphasis¶ on process also complicates the notion of political ‘transitions’ by raising¶ questions about the normativities underlying perceptions of previous¶ periods as well as future ones (Gledhill, 2002; Roseberry, 1985; Verdery,¶ 2002) – and Cuba is particularly burdened by the reification of ‘transition’.¶ An emphasis on historically and contextually specific studies shares¶ conceptual and methodological ground both with historical anthropology’s¶ critique of monolithic views of colonialism, the spread of capitalism and¶ state formation ( Joseph and Nugent, 1994; Roseberry, 1985), and with calls¶ for an ‘ethnography of the state’: these similarly critique binary state/society¶ models (Gupta, 1995; Nugent, 1994), focusing on the ‘degree to which the¶ state has become implicated in the minute texture of everyday life’ (Gupta,¶ 1995: 375) and the specific nature of these intimate relations, where people¶ deal with the corrupt bureaucrat, petition the official representative, avoid¶ the police, and engage in discursive constructions of the state which both¶ inform and make sense of their accommodations and resistances – and¶ which reveal the state as an ‘ensemble of social relations’ ( Jessop, 2002: 40).¶ Cuba both shares in and departs from these broad regional tendencies,¶ and presents a particularly complex historical conjuncture. Centeno notes¶ that ‘[Cuba] remained exceptional during the 1990s as it not only resisted¶ neoliberalism, but also the accompanying democratizing wave’ (2004:¶ 404). Resistance came at an immense social cost: the 1990s in Cuba¶ mirrored the decimation much of the rest of Latin America endured¶ during the 1980s under structural adjustment, and revealed the exclusionary¶ and punitive logic of neoliberal hegemony.3 As mentioned above,¶ resistance entailed accommodation in the marketization of certain sectors,¶ resulting in an economic and social bifurcation and hierarchization,¶ reproducing regional patterns of inequality, informality and migration:¶ these processes (discussed in more detail below) coexist in some tension¶ with the government’s strong political imperatives to firmer resistance in¶ the face of heightened hostility.¶ The Cuban state’s formal ‘ensemble of social relations’ and the¶ ways in which it is ‘implicated in the minute texture of everyday life’, are¶ exemplified by official mass organizations4 with active and highly politicized¶ memberships at neighbourhood level and upwards. These organizations¶ can be seen as attempts to ‘monopolize social allocation’, which¶ Verdery (2002: 382) argues have been characteristic of socialist systems: at¶ the same time, while such ‘monopolization’ cannot be exhaustive, it does tend to view with suspicion unofficial social groupings and dynamics,¶ particularly when these ‘escape’ into informality,5 positing more ambiguous¶ sets of relations. By no means everyone is captured by the mass organizations,¶ and the socially divisive effects of growing inequality work against¶ their efforts to sustain a vigorous attachment to Cuban socialism. For some¶ disaffected sectors of the population, the Cuban state’s resistance to neoliberalism¶ itself represents the continued hegemony of the socialist regime,¶ which is in turn unevenly resisted in a variety of everyday ways, such as¶ evasion, political apathy, valorization of self-interest and, especially, dreams¶ of escape to an imagined capitalist prosperity; and here alienated¶ discourses of a ‘totalizing’ state re-emerge which construct a future resolved¶ by the demise of socialism.

#### **Fixation on imperialism and supremacy masks class issues** **bellhooks 2K** ****(Gloria Jean Watkins, distinguished professor of English at City College in NY – feminist and social activist (Gloria Jean Watkins). Routledge “Where We Stand: Class Matters.”pg 7. http://books.google.com/books?id=kjo9KtF2jqEC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=hooks+%22could+happen+to+any+working+man%22&source=bl&ots=KC2vCfqd\_8&sig=sL3oijKh6A8hidR25AEfRcBz5sY&hl=en&ei=\_fEYTbbWGoT58AbmgKm7Dg&sa=X&oi=book\_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false)****

Class matters. Race and gender can be used as screens to deflect attention away from the harsh realities class politics exposes. Clearly, just when we should all be paying attention to class, using race and gender to understand and explain its new dimensions, society, even our government, say let’s talk about race and racial injustice. It is impossible to talk meaningfully about ending racism without talking about class. Let us not be duped. Let us not be led by spectacles like the O.J. Simpson trial to believe a mass media, which has always betrayed the cause of racial justice, to think that it was all about race, or all about gender. Let us acknowledge that first and foremost it was about class and the interlocking nature of race, sex, and class. Lets face the reality that if O.J. Simpson had been poor or even lower-middle class there would have been no media attention. Justice was never the central issue. Our nations tabloid passion to know about the lives of the rich made class the starting point. It began with money and became a media spectacle that made more money—another case of the rich getting richer. The Simpson trial is credited with upping the GNP by two hundred million dollars. Racism and sexism can be exploited in the interests of class power. Yet no one wants to talk about class. It is not sexy or cute. Better make it seem that justice is class-free—that what happened to O.J. could happen to any working man.

### 2AC – Instability

#### Threats real and not constructed—rational risk assessment goes aff

**Knudsen 1**– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a **misleading conception of threat**, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena **do not occur simultaneously** to large numbers of politicians, and **hardly most of the time**. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they **refer to 'real' phenomena** now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that **urgent action may be required**. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because **situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back** and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

### 2AC – Imperialism K

#### Alt can’t solve – The Cuban embargo reflects a larger expansionist and imperialist desire of the United States

**Lamrani, 13** (Salim Lamrani, 2013, “The Economic War Against Cuba”, <http://books.google.com/books?id=4FIx_3gFJGYC&pg=PA68&lpg=PA68&dq=%22a+Cold+War+anachronism+kept+alive+by+Florida+politics%22+%22&source=bl&ots=-JQhx9zZsW&sig=5E0BkGf1wu9bz7WWPyNuSdDTs6k&hl=en&sa=X&ei=WvLWUdy4DofGrQH_uYDACg&ved=0CDUQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=%22a%20Cold%20War%20anachronism%20kept%20alive%20by%20Florida%20politics%22%20%22&f=false)//EM>

In fact, to grasp Washington`s real purpose in its relations with Cuba, it is necessary to go back to the nineteenth century and heed the warnings of josê Marti, apostle and national hero, who warned the peoples of Latin America against a "convulsed and brutal North," a North that aspired to annex the Caribbean island and dominate the continent." Long in the crosshairs of American expansionism, the island of Cuba, because of its geostrategic position and its natural resources, has always whetted the appetite of the United States. Washington's intervention in the second Cuban War of Independence of 1898 turned Cuba into a protectorate, dependent upon U.S. stewardship. This was a state of aflairs that lasted until the advent ofthe Cuban Revolu- tion onjanuary 1, 1959, at which point the United States lost all control over the destiny of the Caribbean nation. From Dwight D. Eisenhower to Obama, no U.S. govemment has accepted the possibility of a sovereign and independent Cuba, a state of aflairs that explains the imposition of economic sanctions in 1960, sanctions that have continued over the two decades that have followed the "end of history" 218 The state of economic siege of which the Cuban people are victims reminds us that the United States-by applying war- time measures in times of peace against a nation that has never been a threat to its national security-apparently has still not abandoned its old colonial aspiration of integrating Cuba into the U.S. Washington refuses to acknowledge the reality of an Latin American nation finally emancipated from heavy-handed U.S. guardianship and, in all likelihood, does not accept that national sovereignty in Cuba is the sole and exclusive heritage Of the Cuban people. The economic sanctions also demonstrate that the struggle for Cuban self-determination, begun in |868 by Carlos Manuel de Cêspedes, father of the co\.u1try, is a daily battle that is far from won. Marti, both a visionary and a man of his own time, had predicted it: "Freedom costs dearly and it is necessary either to resign yourself to live without it or decide to pay the price."Â°'Â° The preservation of Cuban independence and identity comes, it appears, with a price.

#### Just because knowledge arises in a bad context doesn’t mean the knowledge itself is racist or incorrect.

Fred Halliday IR @ LSE ’93 “ ‘Orientalism’ and its Critics” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20 (2) p. 159-161

The third difficulty with Said's approach is the methodological assumption it makes about the relation between the genesis of ideas and their validity, namely that because ideas are produced in a context of domination, or directly in the service of domination, they are thereby presumed to be invalid. Analogous ideas are to be found in much contemporary debate about ethnocentric and Eurocentric ideas, in the social sciences or elsewhere. Since Said's book was written, this theme has acquired much greater diffusion through cultural nationalism, post-modernism and so on. In the Middle East it can be found in the writings of Islamic writers, such as Khomeini, ever calling on people to be 'alert' biddr, against this corruption, and in the writings of many nationalist intellectuals, be this the later Anouar Abdel-Malek in Egypt or Jalal Al-e Ahmad in Iran, with his concept of westoxification or gharbzadegf. This is, to say the least, a rather contestable assertion, if taken in the context not of the Middle East in particular, or of nationalist assertion, but in its proper academic context-namely, the sociology of knowledge. If I have my disagreements with the epistemological assumptions underlying the approach of Lewis and his fellow writers on 'Islam', I am equally at odds with the epistemological assumptions of Said and the post-modernists. One can do worse than look again at the discussion of this matter by Karl Mannheim in his Ideology and Utopia:37 there are many difficulties with Mannheim's work, not least his view of the free-floating intellectual, but his (liscussion of the relation between genesis and validity is very pertinent here. As he points out, removing some of the polemic from Marx's discussion of ideology, the fact that a particular discovery or idea was produced by a particular interest group, or context-bound individual, tells us nothing about its validity. Medicine, aeronautics, or good food may be produced in such contexts of time, place, culture: they are not therefore to be rejected. The same, with appropriate variations, can apply to social science. Of course, the majority of social science ideas in the world today come from Western Europe and the US and were produced in the context of imperialism and capitalism: it would be odd if this were not so. But this tells us little about their validity. The terms 'Eurocentric' and 'ethnocentric', far too easily bandied about to-day, confuse a statement on historical origin with a covert assessment that needs justification in its own terms. And in one very important sense Eurocentrism is a valid starting point: the economic, social and political system that prevails in the world to-day, with all its variations, including those of the Far East, is a European product and was spread through the combination of economic, military and political pressure known as imperialism. As Karl Marx and Bill Warren alike would have pointed out, Europe has created a world after its own image, like it or not.38 The implications of this issue of origin for the debate on Orientalism should be clear. The first is that in much of the critique of Western writing on the Middle East the assumption is made that because ideas are produced by exploiters this knowledge is therefore invalid. But elementary reflection would suggest that, apart from any possible independence or autonomy of the investigator, the very fact of trying to subjugate a country would to some degree involve producing an accurate picture of it. If you want to dominate a country, you need to know where its mines and oases are, to have a good map, to be aware of its ethnic and linguistic composition and so forth. The experts who came with Napoleon to Egypt in 1798 were part of an imperial project, but the knowledge they produced, whatever its motives, financing, use, had objective value. The same can be said, pari passu, with much later writing on the region. To put it bluntly: if you plan to rob a bank, you would be well advised to have a pretty accurate map of its layout, know what the routines and administrative practices of its employees are, and, preferably, have some idea of who you can suborn from within the organization. This brings me to another point where, perhaps because of professional bias, Said would seem to engage in an injudicious elision- namely, that treatment of texts produced within the social sciences and in related activities such as journalism or travel writing, and literature. Of course, there are similarities and mutual influences; but while one is a necessarily fictional activity, without controls in reality or direct links to the acts of administration, domination, exploitation, the former is so controlled. To assume that the same critique of discourses within literature can be made of those within social science is questionable; it may indeed reflect the hubris, rather too diffuse at the imoment, of theorists deriving their validation from cultural studies. This brings me to the fourth, and final, area of difficulty with the critique of Orientalism, namely its analysis, or rather absence thereof, of the ideas and ideologies of the Middle East itself. Said himself has, in his other writings, been a trenchant critic of the myths of the Middle East and of its politicians, and nowhere more so than in his critique of the poverty of the intellectual life of the Arab world: while the rulers have constructed numerous international airports, he once pointed out, they have failed to construct one good library. But the absence of such a critique in his Orientalism does allow for a more incautious silence, since it prevents us from addressing how the issues discussed by the Orientalists and the relations between East and West are presented in the region itself. Here it is not a question of making any moral equivalence between the myths of the dominators and of the dominated, but of recognizing two other things: first, that when it comes to hypostasis, stereotyping, the projection of timeless and antagonistic myths, this is in no sense a prerogative of the dominator, but also of the dominated; and, secondly, that if we analyse the state of the discourse on the contemporary Middle East, then the contribution of these ideologies of the dominated has been, and remains, enormous, not least because those outside the region who try to overcome the myths of the Orient rather too quickly end up colluding with, or accepting, the myths of the dominated within the region.39 One of the most cogent critiques of Said, made with this in mind, was that of Sadeq al-Azm, published a decade ago in Khamsin.40 If there is a condition such as gharbzadegi, there is also one which I would call sharqzadegz, the uncritical reproduction of myths about the region in the name of anti-imperialism, solidarity, understanding, and so on. Here, of course, the myth-makers of the region see their chance, since they can impose their own stereotypes by taking advantage of confusion within their own countries and without. No-one familiar with the political rhetoric of the region will need much convincing of this tendency to hypostatisation from below: a few hours in the library with the Middle Eastern section of the Summary of World Broadcasts will do wonders for anyone who thinks reification and discursive interpellation are the prerogative of Western writers on the region. The uses made of the term 'the West', to (lenote one single, rational, antagonistic force; the rantings of Islamrists about jdhiliyya; the invalidation of ideas and culture because they are, or are supposed to be, from the VWest; the uncritical but often arbitrary imposition of controls and customs that are supposed to be genuinely from the region; an expression of somie turathl (heritage) or other; the railings against Zionists, Persians, kafirs, traitors and so on with which Middle Eastern political leaders happily puncture their speeches, without apparent qualm or contradiction, or awareness that they themselves are promoting prejudiceall confirm this point. Of course, this hypostatisation is most evident in the discussion of the idea of 'Islam' itself, for no-one is more insistent on the unitary, determinant, timeless, and, in his version, orthodox interpretation of Islam than the fundamentalist. Equally, while brave and critical souls in the West have tried to break the usage of the term 'Muslim' as a denotation of an ethnic or cultural identity, whether in its British or French colonial usages, the reifiers of the region are keen to re-establish this link. In this they are joined by communal politicians in western Europe, who purport to treat all 'Muslims' as one social, cultural or even ethnic group.

**The ideology of imperialism is to deeply entrenched in society that the State has been corrupted and prevents any alternative**

**Van Elteren 3** (Mel, Associate Professor of Social Sciences at Tilburg University, “US Cultural Imperialism Today” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v023/23.2elteren.html)

To the extent that advertising constitutes a pervasive public "art form," however, it has become the dominant mode in which thoughts and experiences are expressed. This trend is most evident in U.S. society. While alternative values and ideologies do exist in this culture, it is harder to find representations for them. Advertising distorts and flattens people's ability to interpret complex experiences, and it reflects the culture only partially, and in ways that are biased toward a capitalist idealization of American culture. 47 At this level, goods are framed and displayed to entice the customer, and shopping has become an event in which individuals purchase and consume the meanings attached to goods. The ongoing interpenetration and crossover between consumption and the aesthetic sphere (traditionally separated off as an artistic counter-world to the everyday aspect of the former) has led to a [End Page 182] greater "aestheticization of reality": appearance and image have become of prime importance. Not only have commodities become more stylized but style itself has turned into a valuable commodity. The refashioning and reworking of commodities—which are themselves carefully selected according to one's individual tastes—achieve a stylistic effect that expresses the individuality of their owner. 48 This provides the framework for a more nuanced and sometimes contradictory second order of meaning. The dynamics of cultural change therefore entail both processes of "traveling culture," in which the received culture (in this case globalizing capitalist culture) is appropriated and assigned new meaning locally, and at the same time a "first order" meaning that dominates and delimits the space for second order meanings—thus retaining something of the traditional meaning of cultural imperialism. The latter is, ultimately, a negative phenomenon from the perspective of self-determination by local people under the influence of the imperial culture. Traditional critiques of cultural globalization have missed the point. The core of the problem lies not in the homogenization of cultures as such, or in the creation of a "false consciousness" among consumers and the adoption of a version of the dominant ideology thesis. Rather, the problem lies in the global spread of the institutions of capitalist modernity tied in with the culturally impoverished social imagery discussed above, which crowd out the cultural space for alternatives (as suggested by critical analysts like Benjamin Barber and Leslie Sklair). The negative effects of cultural imperialism—the disempowerment of people subjected to the dominant forms of globalization—must be located on this plane. It is necessary, of course, to explore in more detail how the very broad institutional forces of capitalist modernity actually operate in specific settings of cultural contact. The practices of transnational corporations are crucial to any understanding of the concrete activities and local effects of globalization. A state-centered approach blurs the main issue here, which is not whether nationals or foreigners own the carriers of globalization, but whether their interests are driven by capitalist globalization.

#### **Their root cause claims are false-there is no single cause of events, rather many different causes**

**Wallerstein**, is an American sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-systems analyst, **97**

(Immanuel, an American sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-systems analyst. His bimonthly commentaries on world affairs are syndicated, 1997, Binghamton.edu "Eurocentrism and its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science," <http://www2.binghamton.edu/fbc/archive/iweuroc.htm>, Accessed: 7/6/13, LPS.)

But even if we agree on the definition and the timing, and therefore so to speak on the reality of the phenomenon, we have actually explained very little. For we must then explain why it is that Europeans, and not others, launched the specified phenomenon, and why they did so at a certain moment of history. In seeking such explanations, the instinct of most scholars has been to push us back in history to presumed antecedents. If Europeans in the eighteenth or sixteenth century did x, it is said to be probably because their ancestors (or attributed ancestors, for the ancestry may be less biological than cultural, or assertedly cultural) did, or were, y in the eleventh century, or in the fifth century B.C. or even further back. We can all think of the multiple explanations that, once having established or at least asserted some phenomenon that has occurred in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, proceed to push us back to various earlier points in European ancestry for the truly determinant variable. There is a premise here that is not really hidden, but was for a long time undebated. The premise is that whatever is the novelty for which Europe is held responsible in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, this novelty is a good thing, one of which Europe should be proud, one of which the rest of the world should be envious, or at least appreciative. This novelty is perceived as an achievement, and numerous book titles bear testimony to this kind of evaluation. There seems to me little question that the actual historiography of world social science has expressed such a perception of reality to a very large degree. This perception of course can be challenged on various grounds, and this has been increasingly the case in recent decades. One can challenge the accuracy of the picture of what happened, within Europe and in the world as a whole in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. One can certainly challenge the plausibility of the presumed cultural antecedents of what happened in this period. One can implant the story of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries in a longer duration, from several centuries longer to tens of thousands of years. If one does that, one is usually arguing that the European "achievements" of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries thereby seem less remarkable, or more like a cyclical variant, or less like achievements that can be credited primarily to Europe. Finally one can accept that the novelties were real, but argue that they were less a positive than a negative accomplishment.

#### Their interpretation of modernity is wrong—the modern is never actual, only virtual—means their impacts based on false assumptions

**Grossberg** (Distinguished Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies, and Adjunct Distinguished Professor of American Studies, Anthropology, and Geography at the University of North Carolina) **10**

(Lawrence, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, pg. 260) //DDI13

The question is neither empirical nor conceptual, but conjunctural and discursive. To theorize the problematic of the modern requires us to inves- tigate the production of the discourses of the modern-what are its condi- tions of possibility, its effectivitics, and its dispersions. Or to put it differ- ently, it involves questions of what might be called conjunctural and epochal ontologies. What are we saying about a context when we call it modern, or when we deny it such a description? What was it that was brought into existence under the sign of euro-modernity that is what we refer to as "the modern"? What sort of answer would not simply condemn the modern to forever becoming euro-modern? I offer a somewhat speculative analysis of fractions of a spatially and historically dispersed conversation on modernity. What can possibly be signaled by the complexity of the contexts and claims made about and for modernity? The analysis does not seek to define either an essence or a simple unity; rather, it points to the virtuality of modern, to a reality that has effects but is never fully actualized, because it can be actualized in multiple ways.

#### Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences

**Gvosdev 5** – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant - concrete action is inevitable - they fail to create useful knowledge

**Friedrichs, 09** [Jorg, University Lecturer in Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development, “From Positivist Pretense to Pragmatic Practice Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship” Pragmatism and International Relations]

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin

#### Today, we continue this punishment of Cuba, “the bad student in class,” via the embargo

**Perez, 8** (Louis A. Perez Jr., 2008, “Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and Imperial Ethos”, pp 150-152)//EM

The metaphor of child further set in relief the image of the island as classroom, the Cubans as students, and the Americans as their teachers. Indeed, education both figuratively and literally—was at the core of the metaphor as paradigm. The classroom was imagined as the site for the transmission of new cultural knowledge and the transformation of political values. Indeed, perhaps the most widely disseminated turn-of—the—century image depicted a classroom setting, typically with Uncle Sam as teacher, often with switch in hand, with Cuba as pupil, often in class with other newly acquired territories represented as classmates, receiving proper lessons on civics and civilization. “Cuba has had more than three years of schooling for the part she has to play,” exulted the Washington Post at the end of the military occupation in 1902. “She will enter the arena as the alumnus ofthe greatest academy on earth — not as a fourth-class trembler, shrinking at the bully’s frown. How effective the tuition has been; with what wisdom the faculty have chosen their material. . . . Our authorities have done their best.106 The metaphor enabled Americans—parents—to persuade themselves that Cubans—children —were obliged to defer to adults as a function of the human life cycle. Just as parental wisdom and adult experience could not yield to pro— tests t'rom the child in need of discipline, the Americans could not permit Cubans to challenge U.S. authority. That Cubans protested North American control was equated with tantrums of misbehaved children that required disciplinary action by the parents. The Cuban demand for seltldetermination, or alternately, Cuban protest of American military intervention, was duly dismissed, or disregarded, characterized as the complanits of children bemoaning the exercise of parental authority. Experience gave meaning to representation.

#### Reframing our metaphorical representations of Cuba is critical to reverse imperialism

**Perez, 8** PhD, J. Carlyle Sitterson Professor of History at University of North Carolina (Louis A. Pérez Jr., 2008, “Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos”, Google Books)//EM

Cuba came to the attention of the world at large principally by way of figura- tive depiction, more precisely, in the form of metaphors imbued with colonial meanings: in the sixteenth century as "the Key of the New World" ("Ia Llave del Nuevo Mundo"), "the Key to the Gulf " ("lr1 Llave del GoUo"), and "the Bulwark of the West Indies" ("eI Antemural de las Indias Occia'enta1es"); in the nineteenth century as "the Queen of the Antilles," "the Pearl of the Antilles," "the Gem of the Antilles," and "the richestjewel in the royal crown," by which time, too, it had earned the designation of "the Ever Faithful lslc" ("Ia Siempre Fidelilsima Isla ")."˜5 Metaphorical representation also developed into the principal mode by which the Americans propounded the possession of Cuba as a matter indispen sable to the future well-being of the United States. To advance a plausible claim to a territory governed by Spain, and to which its inhabitants presumed rightful succession to rule, required the Americans to create a parallel reality by which they persuaded themselves-and sought to persuade others-that Cuba rightfully belonged to them, not only, however, and indeed not even principally, as a matter of self-interest but as a function of providential pur- pose and moral propriety. Metaphorical constructs were central to the process by which national interest was enacted as idealized purpose: at once a combi- nation of denial and dissimulation, a source of entitlement, and a means of empowerment. To understand the North American use of metaphor is to gain insight into the use of cultural models and social relationships in which the U.S. imperial project was conditioned. Metaphors of Cuba served to advance U.S. interests and were, in turn, mediated by racial attitudes and gender hierarchies, on one hand, and prescience of destiny, on the other. They worked best within those belief systems from which Americans obtained their cues concerning mat- ters of civic duty and moral conduct and, indeed, were the principal means by which intent of purpose and reception of meaning were transacted. Figurative depiction drew into complicity all who shared a common cultural system from which collectively to receive the meaning desired of metaphor, what Herbert Clark and Catherine Marshall described as "mutual knowledge based on com- munity membership."" That this process was at the same time a source of knowledge further in- vites attention to the role played by metaphor in the maintenance of systems of domination, and more: it is to be sensible of the cognitive determinants by which the propriety of power was inferred. This was knowledge with conse- quences, for it was assembled as a function of North American needs, that is, interests, and acted upon as a matter of North American normative systems, that is, culture. The importance of metaphor in this context is related directly to its capacity to facilitate moral accommodation to empire, as a way to think about the exer- cise of power and thereby make sense-indeed, to make common sense-of the imperial project. Metaphor provided the means by which Americans came to an understanding of the world around them, the way, psychologist C. C. Anderson suggested, by which metaphors generally make "the unfamiliar, the incongruous, and thc inexplicable" comprehensible." To understand the ways that Americans engaged the Cuba of their imagi- nation is thus to obtain insight into the moral dimension of power, as both a model for conduct and a mode of knowledge." This necessarily involves, Hrst, the examination of the cultural representations by which power insinuated itself into the normative order of daily life. But it also requires attention tothe character of information with which Americans assembled their knowledge of Cuba, as well as its fonn and function-neither ofwhich should be presumed to be a matter of happenstance-and always with the understanding that this information arrived principally in the fomi of culturally conditioned depic- tions. But most of all it requires attention to the ways that these representa- tions themselves were a product of power. This was knowledge assembled as the ideological framework in which the exercise of power was transacted in the form of presumed propriety, whereupon it passed into realms of conventional wisdom and received truths. The efficacy of the metaphor as a medium of representation was contained in its capacity to suggest a moral context into which to inscribe the normative logic of American hegemony. It was to refer the imagination to those shared culturally cletennined behaviors that, when summoned into the service of po- litical purpose, ratified the premise of imperial practice. Metaphor reached deeply into those semiconscious realms of sentiment and sensibility, there to arouse strong feelings that often propelled Americans to act because they "felt" it was the right thing to do: to manipulate emotions and foster predis- position toward some matters and prejudice to others." This was to draw Cuba into domains of North American awareness by way of culturally coher- ent models, derived from familiar experience, thereupon to serve as source for complex narratives by which the logic of domination was validated." Anthro- pologists Deborah Durham and James Femandez posit "a sense of complicity of language" between the author and audience, as one person "making of a metaphor, readily grasped by another, can become an instrument of consen- sus and thus community between them." Philosopher Ted Cohen suggests an- other level: metaphor as a means "to form or acknowledge , . . community and thereby to establish an intimacy between the teller and the hearer/'Z' Metaphorical representations were essential to the claim of moral intent with which Americans presumed to insert themselves into the lives of Cubans. It was not sufficient that Americans persuade themselves of the generosity of their purpose; it was also necessary to persuade Cubans of the benelicence of American motives. Therein lay the moral sources of North American hege- mony in Cuba. The process by which power was exercised-and experienced- had everything to do with the capacity to advance a version of reality to which both peoples more or less willingly subscribed.

#### Criticizing Western “colonialism” obscures more insidious practices by regional powers

Shaw 2 **–** Sussex IR Professor (Martin, The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State, www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm)

Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West. In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely - but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, suffering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -- and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key post-imperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to.

#### We’re the best from of U.S. action – their author supports the protection of security

Ferraro 02 Vincent Ferraro, (The Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics¶ Mount Holyoke College¶ AB, Dartmouth College; MIA, Columbia University; PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)¶ “The Myth of Engagement: America as an Isolationist World Power”¶ April 2002 https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/myth.htm

Separating the sheep from the goats is perhaps good domestic rhetoric, but is probably a poor basis for a foreign policy since it raises all sorts of questions about American intentions. Foreign policy should be directed toward reducing security threats to a state, not pursuing the eradication of evil. There were many opportunities to behave hegemonically after the events of 11 September 2001, but virtually none of these options were pursued. No other state in the international system contested America's invocation of its sovereign right of self-defense, nor did any state regard the incident as anything less than a horrific act of barbarism. America was assured of solid support in responding effectively, but narrowly, to the attack.¶ This universal sympathy was not completely altruistic; all states share a common interest in protecting the right of self-defense. In a hegemonic system, that right ought to be collectively defended, but the United States did not acknowledge, or use, the mechanisms of collective security. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 and NATO members have participated in the war in Afghanistan, but the war itself is not a NATO operation. The United Nations itself had condemned Afghanistan's policy of harboring Osama bin Laden in 1999 in Security Council Resolution 1267, but the Bush Administration has never referred to this resolution as a basis for its actions against Afghanistan. 40

#### Their alt fails – imposing a solution destroys genuine resistance movements – their author

People’s Daily, 63

(People’s Daily, October 22, 1963, Foreign languages Press, “Apologists Of Neo-Colonialism”, http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/neocolon.htm, Accessed 7/5/13, IGM)

The first prescription is labelled peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition.¶ The leaders of the CPSU constantly attribute the great post-war victories of the national liberation movement won by the Asian, African and Latin American peoples to what they call “peaceful coexistence” and “peaceful competition”. The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU says:¶ In conditions of peaceful coexistence, new important victories have been scored in recent years in the class struggle of the proletariat and in the struggle of the peoples for national freedom. The world revolutionary process is developing successfully.¶ They also say that the national liberation movement is developing under conditions of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems and of economic competition between the two opposing social systems and that peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition “assist the unfolding of a process of liberation on the part of peoples fighting to free themselves from the economic domination of foreign monopolies”, and can deliver “a crushing blow” to “the entire system of capitalist relationship”.¶ All socialist countries should practice the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. But peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The victory of the national revolution of all colonies and dependent countries must be won primarily through the revolutionary struggle of their own masses, which can never be replaced by that of any other countries.¶ The leaders of the CPSU hold that the victories of the national liberation revolution are not due primarily to the revolutionary struggles of the masses, and that the people cannot emancipate themselves, but must wait for the natural collapse of imperialism through peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. In fact, this is equivalent to telling the oppressed nations to put up with imperialist plunder and enslavement for ever, and not to rise up in resistance and revolution.

#### **Policy involvement is inevitable- we need to proactively engage in the language of policy making for movements to be effective -** Debating as the federal government is key to understand policy - knowing how the state works is critical to removing its more insidious actions

Themba-Nixon, 2000 Makani. Executive Director of The Praxis Project, Former California Staffer, Colorlines. Oakland: Jul 31, 2000.Vol.3, Iss. 2; pg. 12

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers?The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense.Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

#### The squo is structurally improving

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Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled, global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average **human well-being,** measured by any objective indicator, **has never been higher**. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide. The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006). The reduction in hunger and malnutrition, along with improvements in basic hygiene, improved access to safer water and sanitation, broad adoption of vaccinations, antibiotics, pasteurization and other public health measures, helped reduce mortality and increase life expectancies. These improvements first became evident in today’s developed countries in the mid- to late-1800s and started to spread in earnest to developing countries from the 1950s. The infant mortality rate in developing countries was 180 per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s; today it is 57. Consequently, global life expectancy, perhaps the single most important measure of human well-being, increased from 31 years in 1900 to 47 years in the early 1950s to 67 years today (Goklany 2007a). Globally, average **annual per capita incomes tripled** since 1950. The proportion of the world’s population outside of high-income OECD countries living in absolute poverty (average consumption of less than $1 per day in 1985 International dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity), fell from 84 percent in 1820 to 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2007 (Goklany 2007a; WRI 2008; World Bank 2007). Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. In most countries, people are freer politically, economically and socially to pursue their goals as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb and property. Social and professional mobility has never been greater. It is easier to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth in the lottery of life. People work fewer hours, and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time (Goklany 2007a). Figure 3 summarizes the U.S. experience over the 20th century with respect to growth of population, affluence, material, fossil fuel energy and chemical consumption, and life expectancy. It indicates that population has multiplied 3.7-fold; income, 6.9-fold; carbon dioxide emissions, 8.5-fold; material use, 26.5-fold; and organic chemical use, 101-fold. Yet its life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years and infant mortality (not shown) declined from over 100 per 1,000 live births to 7 per 1,000. It is also important to note that not only are people living longer, they are healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite better diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) occur 8–11 years later now than a century ago (Fogel 2003; Manton et al. 2006). If similar figures could be constructed for other countries, most would indicate qualitatively similar trends, especially after 1950, except Sub-Saharan Africa and the erstwhile members of the Soviet Union. In the latter two cases, life expectancy, which had increased following World War II, declined after the late 1980s to the early 2000s, possibly due poor economic performance compounded, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by AIDS, resurgence of malaria, and tuberculosis due mainly to poor governance (breakdown of public health services) and other manmade causes (Goklany 2007a, pp.66–69, pp.178–181, and references therein). However, there are signs of a turnaround, perhaps related to increased economic growth since the early 2000s, although this could, of course, be a temporary blip (Goklany 2007a; World Bank 2008a). Notably, in most areas of the world, the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, life expectancy adjusted downward for the severity and length of time spent by the average individual in a less-than-healthy condition, is greater now than the unadjusted life expectancy was 30 years ago. HALE for the China and India in 2002, for instance, were 64.1 and 53.5 years, which exceeded their unadjusted life expectancy of 63.2 and 50.7 years in 1970–1975 (WRI 2008). Figure 4, based on cross country data, indicates that contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, both life expectancy and infant mortality improve with the level of affluence (economic development) and time, a surrogate for technological change (Goklany 2007a). Other indicators of human well-being that improve over time and as affluence rises are: access to safe water and sanitation (see below), literacy, level of education, food supplies per capita, and the prevalence of malnutrition (Goklany 2007a, 2007b).

## 1AR

### Cuba Healthcare Low

#### Cuba’s health care system is failing-overstretched and low on supplies

**Pérez, 13** (Roberto de Jesús Guerra Pérez is an independent journalist and founder of the Hablemos Press news agency in Cuba, “Cracks Show in Cuban Healthcare System”, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 1/28/13, [http://iwpr.net/report-news/cracks-show-cuban-healthcare-system)//TL](http://iwpr.net/report-news/cracks-show-cuban-healthcare-system)/TL)

As Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez receives the best treatment that Cuba’s health service can offer, most residents of the country can only dream of similar standards of medical care. Chávez has been in Cuba since December 9 undergoing treatment for a cancer relapse. He is at CIMEQ, the Medical-Surgical Research Centre, a special hospital set aside for the political elite and foreigners. The facility is located in Havana’s Siboney area, home to politicians and top-brass military and close to the embassy district. Such “foreigners’ hospitals”, as Cubans call them, cater for health tourists seeking treatment and plastic surgery, and for the elite. An official who requested anonymity said CIMEQ was for senior figures in the Communist Party, government or parliament; the police, intelligence and security agencies; elite scientists and anyone awarded the title “Hero of Labour”, plus their family members. The official source said Chávez was being treated in a restricted section of the hospital known simply as “Objeto 20”. “The medical technology there is the most advanced in the country, and only government-authorised personnel can enter,” he said, adding that if anyone else went in, “they are immediately ordered out over a loudspeaker, as everything is monitored”. The Cuban government has always stressed the high standard of healthcare available to all, not the few. But the facilities made available to Chávez are not open to the likes of Juana Labrada, a farmworker from the San José de las Lajas municipality of Mayabeque province. Labrada has been waiting four months for cancer surgery. “I still haven’t received notification,” she said. “They’ve told me the Miguel Enrique Hospital has two infected wards so they can’t operate at the moment. They’ve also said that there aren’t [clinical test] reagents.” According to Maritza Martínez, an intensive care specialist in the San Antonio de los Baños municipality, part of Artemisa province near Havana, long waits are the norm. “Thousands of Cubans have to wait months for medical treatment, and they often have to resort to bribery to get things done,” she said. She added that the taxes Cubans paid was not reflected either in the quality of care or in healthcare workers’ wages. Contrary to the perceptions fostered by the government, the hospitals that ordinary Cubans go to are generally poorly maintained and short of staff and medicines. That applies even in the capital, where the Calixto García and Miguel Enrique hospitals are in an advanced state of neglect and deterioration. Inside another Havana institution, the 10 de Octubre teaching hospital, also known as La Dependiente, cracks have opened up in walls left unpainted for years. The floors are stained and surgeries and wards are not disinfected. Doors do not have locks and their frames are coming off. Some bathrooms have no toilets or sinks, and the water supply is erratic. Bat droppings, cockroaches, mosquitos and mice are all in evidence. Doctors at La Dependiente say the consulting rooms are badly contaminated with bacteria, and there are not enough disinfectants to clean them. When five Cuban doctors were shown video footage of the two wards, one said conditions there were part of “a disaster on a national scale”. All spoke off the record, because open criticism of the healthcare system would lead to instant dismissal. Medical staff are circumspect even with their patients, giving them discreet advice about epidemics whose existence the government denies. The authorities have yet to acknowledge the spread of cholera and dengue fever. Human rights activists believe outbreaks of the two diseases have taken dozens of lives in Cuba since June 2012. Since both are associated with standing water, cases increased markedly after Hurricane Sandy devastated eastern parts of the country in late October. (See Disease Spreads in Post-Hurricane Cuba.) Doctors are paid poorly – even a specialist gets just over 560 pesos a month, worth less than 25 US dollars and not nearly enough to support a household. As a result, many accept “donations” from their patients. They are also badly overstretched, a result of government policy of sending doctors overseas. In recent years, Cuba has sent over 40,000 doctors to 70 countries around the world, and the TV news is constantly reporting on their achievements in Haiti, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua and elsewhere. Those left behind struggle to fill the gaps, working long and exhausting shifts for which they are not paid. As Juana Labrada awaits her operation, she says, “I think I’ll have to go to Venezuela to be looked after by Cuban doctors.” In early December, Cuba held its first international conference on public health, attended by delegates and government officials. It was an opportunity to showcase the country’s healthcare system. No one stood up to point out the failings. Roberto de Jesús Guerra Pérez is an independent journalist and founder of the Hablemos Press news agency in Cuba.